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1.  Introduction 
Financial  contracts  are  non-exclusive.  In  credit  markets,  for  example,  borrowers 
cannot credibly commit to take loans from at most one creditor and creditors cannot 
completely prevent borrowers from taking credit from other creditors. This is because 
contracts cannot be made fully contingent on loans from others and in particular on future 
creditors who have not yet lent to the borrower. Such loans, however, could adversely 
affect a borrower’s probability of repayment by exacerbating moral hazard and incentives 
for strategic default (e.g., Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Parlour and Rajan (2001)). The 
prospect of such loans worsens the borrower’s access and terms of credit. When non-
exclusivity is pervasive and cannot be contained, it could also lead to overborrowing, 
high rates of default, credit rationing, and market freezes.
1 
The non-exclusivity of credit contracts has played an important role in several 
financial crises such as the Latin-American debt crisis in the 1970s and the Asian crisis in 
the 1990s (Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004)). Non-exclusivity has 
also been identified as an important factor behind the high interest rates and default rates 
in the consumer credit card market (Parlour and Rajan (2001)). More recently, the non-
exclusivity in the credit derivatives market has played a central role in the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008. Acharya and Bisin (2010), for example, argue that the non-exclusivity of 
financial contracts coupled with the opacity of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets—
where credit default swaps (CDS) trade— played a central role in the current financial 
crisis by creating severe counterparty risk externalities. The risk that a party—in this case 
                                                 
1 A stream of theoretical papers has studied the role of non-exclusivity in financial contracting. 
See, among others, Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), Parlour and Rajan 
(2001), Bisin and Guaitoli (2004), Bennardo et al. (2009), and Attar et al. (2010) for a theoretical 
analysis of non-exclusivity in different game-theoretic settings.  
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the seller of a CDS— might not be able to fulfill its future obligations depends largely on 
other, often subsequent, exposures. In a theoretical model, the authors show that more 
transparency on counterparty risk exposures in the OTC market could have helped the 
contracting parties internalize the externalities.  
These  insights  are  in  line  with  parallel  theoretical  work  on  the  role  of  the 
institutional framework on credit markets. For example, collateral and credit registries 
could help creditors protect their claims and thus dampen the impact of non-exclusivity 
on credit availability. Collateral, whose effective use is facilitated by a collateral registry, 
could mitigate moral hazard and incentives for strategic default (Holmström and Tirole 
(1997) and Parlour and Rajan (2001)). Credit registries could in some cases allow lenders 
to effectively employ ex-post punishment to enforce exclusivity or mitigate the resulting 
externalities by conditioning their terms on loans from others (Bennardo et al. (2009)).  
Despite  the  substantial  theoretical  work  on  the  impact  of  non-exclusivity  on 
financial contracts and its role in major financial crises, up to now, no direct test of the 
impact of non-exclusivity on the functioning of financial markets was possible due to 
lack of adequate data. This paper aims to fill this void by employing a unique dataset 
containing information on a creditor’s internal limit to the borrower both before and after 
a non-exclusivity event realizes. The internal limit indicates the maximum amount this 
creditor is willing to lend to a borrower; it represents the amount for which the bank’s 
loan supply becomes vertical. Changes in the internal limit represent changes in loan 
supply. Hence, using this information, we investigate how a creditor’s willingness to lend 
reacts after a firm with whom it held an exclusive relationship acquires loans from other 
creditors, which we refer to as outside loans. This would not be possible using data on the   4
outstanding level of credit as this is an equilibrium outcome driven both by demand and 
supply factors whereas the theory concerns supply effects. The empirical analysis takes 
place  in  a  setting  where  individual  trades  with  other  creditors  can  be  observed  and 
contractual features, such as collateral, can be employed efficiently. 
Our empirical evidence is consistent with the theories on contractual externalities. 
In particular, we find that when a previously exclusive firm, obtains a loan from another 
bank, the firm’s initial bank decreases its internal limit to the firm and it decreases it 
more the larger the size of the outside loans. We find that $1 from another bank leads to a 
decrease in the initial bank’s willingness to lend by 33 to 43 cents. Robustness tests show 
that these findings are not driven by reverse causality, omitted variable bias, or a reduced 
ability  to  extract  rents.  Consistent  with  the  theoretical  literature  on  contractual 
externalities, we also find that the initial bank’s willingness to lend does not change when 
its existing and future loans are protected from the increased risk of default. In particular, 
we find that an outside loan does not trigger any change in the initial bank’s willingness 
to lend if its existing and future loans retain seniority over the outside loans and the 
claims are secured with assets whose value is high and stable over time. 
While there have not been direct investigations of the non-exclusivity externality 
using  credit  supply,  several  papers  have  investigated  the  reasons  and  the  impact  of 
establishing single versus multiple bank relationships. Some studies have found that older 
and larger firms and firms in countries with a lower degree of judicial efficiency are more 
likely to maintain multiple relationships (for an overview of the empirical studies see 
Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009)). Some papers also find that firms that borrow from 
multiple banks are of lower quality (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and Körting   5
(1998)). Farinha and Santos (2002) follow the debt share of firms after initiating multiple 
relationships. They find that the bank with which the firm had an exclusive relationship 
loses quickly importance over time. While the findings are overall consistent with the 
presence of significant negative externalities stemming from the non-exclusivity of loan 
contracts, these studies do not identify the driving force behind these associations as they 
cannot disentangle demand and supply factors.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the 
literature  and  develops  two  testable  hypotheses.  Section  3  presents  the  data  and  the 
institutional  setting,  while  Section  4  describes  our  identification  strategy.  Section  5 
discusses our results and various robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Hypotheses on the Impact of Non-Exclusivity in Financial Contracting 
To structure our empirical analysis, we review the extant theoretical literature and 
summarize  the  key  insights  in  two  testable  hypotheses.  We  also  briefly  discuss  the 
institutional environment to better position our analysis into this literature. Finally, we 
also discuss alternative theories and their implications for our analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, the inefficiencies resulting from the non-exclusivity of financial 
contracts are addressed in several theoretical papers, each highlighting different sources 
of  the  resulting  externalities.  Regardless  of  the  model  employed,  additional  outside 
lending  imposes  externalities  on  the  existing  lender  by  increasing  the  borrower’s 
probability of default— the specific channel varies across models. 
In Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Bennardo et al. (2009) an outside loan imposes 
externalities  on  prior  debt  by  exacerbating  the  borrower’s  moral  hazard  incentives.   6
Everything else equal, a higher total indebtedness reduces the borrower’s work effort 
leading  to  higher  probability  of default  as  in  Holmström  (1979) and  Holmström  and 
Tirole (1997). The outside loan imposes an externality on existing debt because the terms 
of the loan do not reflect the resulting devaluation of the existing debt. This is in contrast 
to  a  one-creditor  environment  where  all  effects  are  internalized  by  the  sole  creditor. 
Because new lenders do not pay for the externality they impose on existing debt, they can 
offer loans with more attractive terms.
2 As a result borrowers cannot credibly commit to 
exclusivity.  Recognizing  the  possibility  of  future  outside  loans,  the  initial  creditor 
requires higher interest rates for any given loan (or put differently lends a smaller amount 
for any given interest rate) than it would if borrowers could commit to exclusivity. This 
in turn decreases the maximum amount of loans that the borrower can support. 
In Parlour and Rajan (2001) and Bennardo et al. (2009) the non-exclusivity creates 
incentives  for  strategic  defaults.  The  authors  show  that  when  multiple  lenders  can 
simultaneously offer loans to a borrower, incentives to overborrow with intentions to 
default  could  arise  when  borrowers  can  exempt  a  large  fraction  of  their  assets  from 
bankruptcy  proceedings.  Everything  else  equal,  these  incentives  increase  in  the  total 
amount borrowed. Hence, multiple lending in this setting creates an externality to all 
lenders as each loan increases the default risk of the others, which inhibits competition 
and  undermines  the  availability  and  the  terms  of  credit.  When  the  externalities  are 
pervasive, it could also result in credit rationing (Bennardo et al. (2009)).  
                                                 
2  This  sequential  contracting  creates  incentives  for  opportunistic  lending  i.e.,  lenders  have 
incentives to target the customers of other creditors with attractive offers at the expense of the 
initial lenders. These incentives arise because new lenders do not pay for the externality they 
impose on existing debt, while they can protect their own claims from the increased risk (e.g., 
through higher interest rates).  
   7
Overall, the theories on contractual externalities predict that when a borrower obtains 
a loan from another creditor, the maximum amount that the borrower’s initial creditor 
will be willing to lend to this borrower should decrease and it should decrease more the 
larger the outside loan.
3 This motivates our first testable hypothesis: 
 
(H1) The theory on contractual externalities predicts that when a borrower obtains an 
outside loan, then the maximum amount that the initial creditor will be willing to lend to 
the borrower will decrease and it will decrease more the larger the outside loan.  
 
Creditors  could  employ  several  contractual  features  to  mitigate  the  externalities 
resulting  from  the  non-exclusivity  of  debt  contracts.  For  example,  they  could  use 
covenants that make loan terms contingent on future borrowing from other sources. Such 
covenants, however, are not widely used because they introduce other inefficiencies.
4 
Moreover, as Attar et al. (2010) point out the ability of covenants to enforce exclusivity is 
                                                 
3  If  the  initial  creditor  anticipated  the  externalities  and  priced  its  debt  correctly,  the  initial 
creditor’s willingness to lend to the borrower should drop by an amount equal to the outside loan. 
An additional drop might be needed if, for example, the outside bank’s willingness to lend was 
larger than expected. This drop will again depend positively on the size of the outside loan since 
the borrower’s probability of default increases in the size of its total debt.  
 
4 For example, with the use of debt covenants creditors could permit future borrowing only with 
the approval of existing creditors. This, however, would give veto power to existing creditors and 
open the door to hold-up problems (see, for example, Smith and Warner (1979) and Bizer and 
DeMarzo (1992)). Although hold-up problems could be mitigated if contracts could specify ex 
ante the exact circumstances under which borrowing would be allowed, designing fully state-
contingent contracts is very difficult in practice and often prohibitively expensive. Making debt 
callable is an alternative mechanism. As pointed out in Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), this would 
solve the problem only if the call price equals the fair market value of debt in the absence of 
further borrowing. For this to be true the contract would either have to specify the fair market 
value ex ante, which is as complex as writing a fully state-contingent contract or base the call 
price on the ex post market price of debt, which again gives rise to hold-up problems.  
   8
bounded by limited liability; in some cases covenants may even aggravate the problem by 
creating incentives for opportunistic lending. 
Another approach, first discussed in Fama and Miller (1972), is to prioritize debt (i.e., 
allow the borrower’s existing debt to retain seniority over new loans). As pointed out in 
Bizer  and  DeMarzo  (1992),  this  will  not  solve  the  externalities  from  sequential 
contracting if the higher levels of debt increase the incentives for moral hazard. Asking 
borrowers to pledge collateral could mitigate the increased incentive for moral hazard 
i.e., the fear of losing the pledged assets could induce high effort (Holmström and Tirole 
(1997)).
5 According to Parlour and Rajan (2001), collateral could also be interpreted as a 
commitment to accept only one contract since it is by definition a non-exempt asset.
6  
A floating charge on the borrower’s assets—a special form of collateral that carries 
over to future loans— could be an effective way to mitigate the contractual externalities 
as it allows the initial creditor’s existing and future loans to retain seniority over future 
outside  loans  and  at  the  same  time  curtail  incentives  for  moral  hazard  and  strategic 
default resulting from the higher levels of debt.
7 The degree to which a floating charge 
will mitigate the externalities from future outside loans depends positively on the value of 
                                                 
5 Collateral is also motivated in the literature as a way to mitigate other ex post frictions such as 
difficulties in enforcing contracts (Banerjee and Newman (1993), Albuquerque and Hopenhayan 
(2004))  and  costly  state  verification  (e.g.,  Townsend  (1979),  Gale  and  Hellwig  (1985), 
Williamson (1986), and Boyd and Smith (1994)). 
 
6 In the context of Attar et al. (2010) valuable collateral could be viewed as a way to sidestep 
limited liability (i.e., an alternative to using courts to enforce unlimited liability). 
 
7 Djankov et al. (2008) find that debt contracts secured with a floating charge are enforced more 
efficiently: they have higher recovery rates and shorter enforcement times.  
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the pledged assets and negatively on the volatility of their values.
8 If, for example, the 
initial creditor’s claims are fully protected for the higher risk of default, an outside loan 
will not impose any externalities to the existing lender and thus should not trigger any 
changes in its willingness lend. Regular collateral might not solve the externalities as it 
does not extend to future loans. This leads us to our second testable hypothesis: 
 
(H2) The theory on contractual externalities predicts that an outside loan will not trigger 
a change in the initial creditor’s willingness to lend if the initial creditor’s existing and 
future claims are fully protected.  
 
H1 and H2 are tested in the context of a modern banking system, where collateral and 
credit registries are operational, allowing lenders to mitigate the negative externalities 
from the non-exclusivity of loan contracts. Everything, else equal, collateral registries 
facilitate the effective use of collateral (Haselmann et al. (2010)). Similarly, information 
sharing through credit registries could allow lenders to mitigate the negative externalities 
by conditioning their offers on future borrower behavior (see, for example, Bennardo et 
al. (2009)).
9 Before turning to a detailed description of our data  and the institutional 
framework we briefly discuss the predictions of alternative theories.  
                                                 
8 Bennardo et al. (2009) show that high volatility in the value of pledged assets gives outside 
creditors’ incentives to engage in opportunistic lending and induce overborrowing. See also Attar 
et al. (2010) on the limitations of covenants due to limited liability. 
 
9 Bennardo et al. (2009) point out that although information sharing is expected for the most part 
to mitigate the contractual externalities and expand the availability of credit it could also facilitate 
opportunistic lending if the value of the assets securing the existing debt is very volatile. See also 
Attar et al. (2010) on the limitations of covenants due to limited liability. 
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In addition to the literature on contractual externalities, alternative theories predict 
that  multiple  financing  sources  may  actually  decrease  the  borrower’s  probability  of 
default, and thus increase the initial creditor’s willingness to lend. This could happen, for 
example, if the outside loans facilitate a worthwhile project that the initial creditor could 
not finance alone (e.g., due to lack of sufficient liquidity as in Detragiache et al. (2001) or 
a too large exposure to the borrower as in Hertzberg et al. (2011)).
10 In sharp contrast 
with H1, an outside loan in this case should increase the initial creditor’s willingness to 
lend and it should increase it more the larger the outside loan. Hence, finding evidence 
consistent with H1 would not necessarily imply that these alternative theories are not at 
work. It would only imply that the theories on contractual externalities are at work and 
that they are sufficiently important to dominate empirically.  
 
3. Data and Institutional Setting 
The paper makes use of a unique dataset containing detailed information on all 
corporate  clients  of  one  of  the  four  largest  banks  in  Sweden.
11  The  dataset  contains 
detailed information on the contract and performance characteristics of all commercial 
loans  between  April  2002  and  December  2008  as  well  as  information  about  the 
borrowing firm. For each loan, we observe the origination and maturity dates, type of 
credit, loan amount, interest rate, fees, collateral as well as its subsequent performance. 
                                                 
10 The willingness of another lender to extend credit to a borrower could also be perceived as a 
positive  signal  about  the  borrower’s  quality  (e.g.,  Biais  and  Gollier  (1997)).  A  signal  from 
another lender could be particularly useful when the initial creditor is relatively uninformed or the 
prospects of the borrower are uncertain. 
 
11  The  Swedish  banking  market  is  rather  concentrated  with  the  four  largest  banking  groups 
accounting for around 80 percent of total banking assets. At the end of 2003, there were a total of 
125 banks established in Sweden.  
   11
For each firm, we observe its industry, ownership structure, credit history, credit scores 
as well as the bank’s internal limit to the firm—our key explanatory variable.  
A bank’s internal limit to a firm indicates the maximum amount that the bank is 
willing to lend to the firm. In economic terms, it indicates the amount for which the 
bank’s  loan  supply  becomes  vertical.  Hence,  changes  in  the  internal  limit  represent 
changes in loan supply.  Loan officers are not allowed to grant loans that exceed the 
limit—  they  can  only  lend  up  to  that  amount.  The  internal  limits  are  not  directly 
communicated to firms as they do not involve a commitment from the bank— this in 
sharp contrast to credit lines that are communicated and typically committed.
12 
A firm’s internal limit is determined based on the firm’s repayment ability. It can 
change during the so called “commitment review” meetings, where the exposure towards 
the  firm  is  reevaluated.  The  meetings  typically  take  place  once  a  year  on  a  date 
determined at the end of the previous meeting, but they can be moved to an earlier date if 
the  firm’s  condition  changes  substantially  (e.g.,  if  the  firm  has  new  investment 
opportunities or the firm’s condition deteriorates substantially). To determine a firm’s 
internal limit, the committee makes use of both internal proprietary information (e.g., the 
loan  officer’s  evaluation  report)  as  well  as  external  public  information.  For  example, 
through  the  main  Swedish  credit  bureau,  Upplysningscentralen  (UC),  the  bank  can 
observe whether the firm had recent repayment problems with other financial and non-
financial  institutions,  the  firm’s  external  rating,  the  number,  amount,  and  value  of 
                                                 
12 The extant empirical literature has employed lines of credit to study several aspects of the 
credit markets such as credit constraints and default risk (see, for example, Sufi (2009), Jiménez 
et  al.  (2009),  and  Norden  and  Weber  (2010)).  Although  the  internal  limit  is  not  directly 
communicated, firms could indirectly learn their internal limits when they become binding. We 
return to this in the next section when we discuss our methodology. 
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collateral on all outstanding bank loans as well as the number of loan applications. (The 
bank identities are not revealed.) This information is updated monthly and at any point in 
time the bank can obtain a report with historical data for the past twelve months.
13 
Hence,  the  Swedish  institutional  setting  is  such  that  banks  know  about  past 
transactions  with  other  creditors  and  can  learn  quickly  about  the  borrowers’  future 
borrowing.
14 This provides us with a unique opportunity to study whether the theories on 
contractual externalities are at work by studying how the internal limit changes following 
the origination of loans from another bank. (These loans are not syndicated as otherwise 
the initial creditor can fully control the borrower’s loan taking behavior.) As explained 
below, the bank’s response is benchmarked relative to otherwise similar firms. 
To obtain additional information about the firm, the bank dataset is merged with 
accounting data from the main credit bureau, UC, and information from the Swedish 
registration office, Bolagsverket. In particular, to determine a firm’s age, the firm’s date 
of  registration  is  obtained  from  Bolagsverket.  The  available  information  from 
Bolagsverket allows us (as well as current or prospective lenders) to determine whether 
the firm has posted  collateral on  any of its outstanding loans and observe whether a 
lender has a floating charge on the firm. Data on the value and volatility of the floating 
charge assets are obtained from the bank dataset and the firm’s accounting statements.
15  
                                                 
13 Information from the firm’s annual accounting statements is also provided for corporations. 
 
14 In addition, the Swedish firms have few bank relationships (see, for example, Ongena and 
Smith (2000)). Non-exclusivity events are therefore part of this institutional setting, providing us 
with a unique laboratory to identify the role of the non-exclusivity externalities. 
 
15 The law determines the types of assets that can be pledged under a floating charge claim and 
the creditors’ rights when a borrower defaults. As of 2004, a floating charge includes inventory, 
accounts receivable, equipment, real estate, financial assets such as cash, bank deposits, bonds, 
and stocks and can be invoked during bankruptcy like other collateral types (see Lag (2003:528)   13
 
4. Methodology 
To test H1 and H2 we use a matching procedure. This procedure allows us to 
benchmark the adjustment in the internal limit of firms that obtain loans from other banks 
(the treatment group) with the adjustment in the internal limit of similar firms that do not 
obtain loans from other banks (the control group). Similar firms are obtained by matching 
on several firm characteristics at the time of the non-exclusivity event. By matching, we 
minimize the likelihood that other factors—besides the loans from other banks— are 
driving the observed  adjustments. Next, we describe in detail how our treatment and 
control groups are defined as well as the firm characteristics that we match on.  
 
A. Treatment and Control Groups: Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
The treatment group consists of firms that enter the sample with an exclusive 
relationship with our bank and at some point during the sample period obtain a loan from 
another bank. (We define a relationship as exclusive if the firm borrows only from our 
bank for at least one year and we refer to the first loan(s) from other banks as “outside 
loan(s)”.) We identify whether a firm obtains an outside loan by comparing the bank’s 
total outstanding loans to the firm with the firm’s total bank debt reported in the firm’s 
annual  accounting  statements.  This  allows  us  to  once  a  year identify  whether  a  firm 
borrows from another bank.   
To investigate how the bank responds to an outside loan, we compare the internal 
limits around the time of the non-exclusivity event. Figure 1 illustrates our event window. 
                                                                                                                                                 
om Företagsinteckningar and Cerqueiro et al. (2011)). Banks typically combine a floating charge 
with a negative pledge clause to ensure the priority and value of the floating charge.   14
Let  ' t   indicate  when  the  firm obtains a  loan from  another  bank (i.e., when the  non-
exclusivity event takes place). Let t0 indicate the time that the firm’s first accounting 
statements following the non-exclusivity event are reported (i.e., this is when we can first 
observe the outside loan(s)) and t0-12 to indicate the time of the firm’s last accounting 
statements prior to the non-exclusivity event. Since the bank decides on the internal limit 
once a year—during its annual commitment review meeting— there are two possibilities 
about the timing of any reaction following the non-exclusivity event: either the meeting is 
held sometime between  ' t  and t0 or it is held sometime between t0 and t0+12. Hence, to 
study how the bank reacts to the non-exclusivity event we compare the bank’s internal 
limit between t0-12 and t0+12 (i.e., the  12 12 0 0 / - + t t Limit Limit  of treated firms).
16  
 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Due  to  the  length  of  the  event  window  and  the  available  sample  period,  the 
treatment group contains firms that obtain a loan from another bank any time during the 
period 2004:04 to 2007:12. Given that data are available between 2002:04 and 2008:12, 
this allows us to verify that all firms enter the sample period with at least one year of an 
exclusive relationship with our bank and gives us one year after the last possible non-
exclusivity event to observe the bank’s limit at t0+12. We omit firms with an internal 
limit lower than SEK 100,000 (this corresponds to about €10,000 euro) at time t0-12 since 
                                                 
16 If the firm’s relationship with the bank is terminated prior to t0+12, we use the last observed 
limit between t0 and t0+12. This involves 6% of the treated firms. About 5% of Swedish firms 
have accounting periods longer than one year. We exclude those firms from our sample.  
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such small exposures are typically determined rather “mechanically”.
17 Similarly, we also 
omit non-exclusivity events with trivial amounts since externalities are expected to be 
small (if any). In particular, we require that the loan from the other bank is at least 1% of 
the firm’s internal limit at t0-12. Finally, since our goal is to investigate how the bank’s 
loan supply reacts to the non-exclusivity event, we do not include firms whose internal 
limit at t0-12 is binding (i.e., it is equal to their outstanding loans and unused credit lines 
at t0-12) and thus can be driven by both demand and supply factors. 
This yields a total of 991 treated firms. Figure 2 reports the number of treated 
firms in each year as a percentage of the firms with an exclusive lending relationship for 
which the internal limit is not binding. As can be observed in Figure 2, this percentage is 
fairly constant over time, ranging between 4.5% and 5.5%, which is comparable to rates 
found in other studies (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Farinha and Santos (2002) 
report rates of 4.5% and 4% per year using data from Bolivia and Portugal, respectively). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
In  Table  1  we  compare  the  characteristics  of  the  treated  firms  relative  to  the 
“universe” of firms with our bank (i.e., all firms with an outstanding loan at our bank 
during  the sample  period).
18 Compared  to  the  “universe”,  the  treated  firms are  faster 
                                                 
17 Firms may always be able to hold a company credit card with a minimum amount. Such 
amounts are typically determined mechanically. Since we want to focus on strategic interactions, 
we do not include such automated decisions. 
 
18 For the treated firms, we report their characteristics just prior to the outside loan (i.e., at t0-12). 
Hence,  the  number  of  observations  is  equal  to  the  number  of  unique  treated  firms.  For  the 
“universe”, we report their characteristics for the period they maintained a lending relationship 
with our bank, which yields 51,164 firm-year observations for 19,197 unique firms.    16
growing firms with more tangible assets, lower cash flows, higher risk of default (e.g., 
higher default probabilities, worse credit ratings, and worse credit histories), larger limits 
relative to their assets, larger distance to limit, and higher interest rates on outstanding 
debt.
19 Overall, these differences suggest that the treated firms are not a random draw of 
the population and highlight the importance of controlling as much as possible for firm 
characteristics that may influence the bank’s internal limits as well as the probability of 
obtaining an outside loan. Our matching procedure is geared to meet this challenge. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
We begin by identifying a possible set of control firms. This includes firms that, 
like the treated firms, have an exclusive relationship with our bank at t0-12 for at least one 
year, but unlike the treated firms retain this exclusive relationship for at least until the end 
of the event window, t0+12.
20 Using information from the accounting statements, the 
credit registry, and the bank dataset we match the two groups with respect to several 
characteristics at the beginning of the event window, t0-12. By matching we select the 
sub-sample  of  treated  firms  for  which  a  similar  control  firm  can  be  found  and  we 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 Approximately 60% of the average treated and control firms’ debt is bank debt. Non-bank debt 
consists almost entirely of trade credit for both the treated and the control firms as most of these 
firms do not have access to the bond market, a typical characteristic of small and medium sized 
enterprises with single banking relationship. 
 
20 In robustness checks, presented in Section 5.1.2, we also require that the control firm got a loan 
from the initial bank of similar size to the treated firm’s outside loan between t0-12 and t0 (i.e., we 
require that during the same period the matched firms had a similar demand for loans). 
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benchmark the bank’s adjustment in the limit relative to the “matched control” firm over 
the same period (i.e.,  control t t treated t t Limit Limit Limit Limit ] / [ ] / [ 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 - + - + - ).  
The matching variables are selected with respect to factors that are acknowledged 
by the bank to be instrumental in its determination of the limits as well as variables that 
are identified in the literature to affect a firm’s likelihood of obtaining an outside loan 
(i.e., the likelihood of replacing or adding a banking relationship).
21 Hence, apart from 
matching  on  calendar-time,  the  identity  of  the  initial  bank,  and  key  relationship 
characteristics through the way we define the eligible set of control firms, we also match 
on several firm characteristics. This includes publicly observable firm characteristics as 
well as characteristics that might only be observable to the initial bank (i.e., proprietary 
information gathered through past interactions).  
The set of publicly observable characteristics includes industry, firm age, firm 
size, asset growth, tangible assets, cash flows, indicators of leverage such as total debt to 
total assets and total bank debt to total assets, external credit rating, and indicators of 
recent  repayment  problems.  Some  of  these  variables  are  observable  (to  us  and  other 
banks) through the firm’s accounting statements. Others are observable through the credit 
registry. To control for bank proprietary information we also match on the firm’s internal 
limit, the distance to limit (i.e., the difference between the firm’s internal limit and its 
outstanding bank debt and committed but unused credit lines), and the interest rate on the 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Detragiache et al. (2000), Ongena and Smith (2001), Farinha and Santos 
(2002), Berger et al. (2005), and Gopalan et al. (2011). Our bank was not involved in a merger 
during our sample period (see, for example, Sapienza (2002) and Degryse et al. (2011) for the 
effects of bank mergers on loan contracts and incentives to seek outside loans). 
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most recently originated inside loan.
22 The internal variables can be particularly useful in 
capturing relevant firm characteristics that are unobservable to us, but observable to the 
initial bank and thus key in the determination of the firm’s internal limit and incentives to 
seek an outside loan. These internal variables are included only in our most conservative 
matching set (Match 2) as they come at the expense of degrees of freedom. Table 2 
summarizes and defines our matching variables.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The matching exercise yields 1,421 pairs corresponding to 350 treated firms and 
1,170  control  firms  (Match  1).
23  When  we  also  match  on  the  internal  variables,  the 
sample is reduced to 549 pairs with 207 treated firms and 507 control firms (Match 2). 
The descriptive statistics of the two “matched treated” groups are reported in Table 1 to 
facilitate comparison with respect to the other two groups. The treated firms for which a 
match can be found are overall better than their 991 treated counterparts. They are older 
firms, with more tangible assets, higher cash flows, higher leverage ratios, and a lower 
risk of default (e.g., lower default probabilities and perfect credit histories). They also 
have smaller outside loans relative to their total assets or internal limit. 
 
                                                 
22 When a firm has more than one recently originated loan outstanding at t0 – 12, we use the 
highest interest rate among those loans. Similar results are obtained if we use the average interest 
rate or the bank’s internal rating instead. Matching on the interest rate as opposed to ratings is 
preferred for the specifications presented in the tables because the ratings are sometimes missing.  
 
23 Each treated firm can be matched with more than one control firm. Similarly, a control firm 
could be a match for more than one treated firm. Treated firms without a match are dropped.  
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B. Empirical Specifications 
Using the matched samples, we estimate the following baseline model:  
 
e a + = y ,      (1) 
 
where  the  dependent  variable,  y  (which  we  refer  to  as  the  bank’s  “standardized 
response”) is the difference in the adjustment of the internal limit between the “treated” 
firms and their matched “control” counterparts: 
 
control t t treated t t Limit Limit Limit Limit y ] / [ ] / [ 12 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 - + - + - = ,
 
 
a  is the constant term, and e is the error term in equation (1). The model is estimated 
using  OLS  with  the  standard  errors  clustered  at  the  treated  firm-level.  Because  each 
treated  firm  can  be  matched  with  multiple  firms, the  point estimates  are  adjusted  by 
weighting the observations by one over the number of matched control firms for each 
treated firm as in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010).
24 A negative and statistically significant 
a  indicates that banks decrease their loan supply when a firm originates a loan from 
another bank, consistent with the theories on contractual externalities and H1. It also 
implies  the  net  empirical  dominance  of  these  theories  over  alternative  theories  that 
predict an increase in the initial creditor’s willingness to lend. 
                                                 
24  As  discussed  later,  the  results  are  robust  to  using  different  estimation  techniques  (e.g., 
clustering the standard errors with respect to both the treated and the control firm as discussed in 
Cameron et al. (2006), Thompson (2006), and  Petersen (2009) or  using  one observation  per 
treated  firm  by  randomly  selecting  one  of  the  matched  control  firms—when  the  matching 
procedure yields multiples— and clustering the standard errors at the control firm-level).   
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To examine whether the bank’s response varies with the size of the outside loan 
we augment equation (1) by adding the size of the outside loan scaled by total assets, 
OutsideLoan, as an explanatory variable
25:  
 
e b a + + = n OutsideLoa y 1 .      (2) 
 
The  constant  term,  a ,  measures  the  bank’s  response  when  the  OutsideLoan  is  zero, 
while  1 b  measures the degree to which the bank’s response varies with the size of the 
outside loan. A negative  1 b  and a zero or insignificant a  would be consistent with H1. 
To test H2, we augment equation (2) by introducing an interaction between the 
OutsideLoan and the degree to which the initial bank’s claims are protected, Z: 
 
ε Z β Z n OutsideLoa β n OutsideLoa β α y + + * + + = 3 2 1 .    (3) 
 
The constant term, a , measures the bank’s response when the OutsideLoan is zero and 
its claims are not protected.  1 b  measures the degree to which the bank’s response varies 
with the OutsideLoan when its claims are not protected and  2 b  measures the difference 
in the bank’s response when its claims are protected. Finally,  3 b  measures the bank’s 
response when its claims are protected and the OutsideLoan is zero. A negative  1 b , a 
positive  2 b , and a zero or insignificant a  and  3 b  would be consistent with H2.  
                                                 
25 We use the value of total assets prior to the outside loan at t0-12 to avoid endogeneity problems. 
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To capture the degree to which the bank’s claims are protected, Z, we mainly 
employ three indicators: a dummy variable indicating whether the bank has a floating 
charge  on  the  firm’s  assets  (FloatingCharge)  as  well  as  two  qualifying  variables 
regarding the value of the floating charge assets (FloatingChargeValue) and the volatility 
of  their  values  (FloatingChargeVolatility),  The  FloatingChargeValue  is  equal  to  the 
value of the floating charge assets as reported by the bank, scaled by committed bank 
debt (i.e., outstanding debt + unused credit lines) at t0-12. The FloatingChargeVolatility 
is equal to the volatility of earnings in the three years preceding t0-12 divided by the 
firm’s average assets over that period.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of treated firms with 
and  without  a  floating  charge  using  our  most  conservative  set  of  matching  variables 
(Match  2).  The  two  groups  of  firms  are  remarkably  similar.  The  only  statistically 
significant difference between them is with respect to age and asset growth: firms with a 
floating  charge  are  younger  with  somewhat  slower  growth.  With  respect  to  other 
characteristics, they appear to be of a slightly lower quality (with less tangible assets, 
lower cash flows, a somewhat higher probability of default, and worse external ratings). 
These differences, however, are not statistically significant. 
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5. Results  
We now test our two hypotheses. We first document the bank’s average reaction 
after  the  firm  obtains  a  loan  from  another  bank  and  the  degree  to  which  the  bank’s 
reaction depends on the size of the outside loan (H1). We then subject these results to 
several robustness checks with respect to possible endogeneity issues as well as possible 
alternative explanations for our findings and then examine the degree to which the bank’s 
response is mitigated when its claims are protected (H2). 
 
5.1. Non-Exclusivity Externalities and the Size of the Outside Loan: Test of H1  
 
5.1.1. Main Results 
Table 4 reports our findings with respect to H1. Column (I) reports the bank’s 
average response (i.e., equation (1)). Column (II) documents how the bank’s response 
varies with the size of the outside loan (i.e., equation (2)). For both specifications we 
match the “treated” and “control” firms with respect to all the variables discussed above 
except  for  the  bank-internal  variables—  the  latter  are  added  in  corresponding 
specifications reported in Columns (III) and (IV).
26 As mentioned earlier, matching on 
the internal variables allows us to better control for unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
 
                                                 
26 Theses specifications are estimated using OLS, weighting the observations by one over the 
number of control firms per treated firm and clustering the standard errors with respect to the 
treated firm. Similar results are the obtained if the standard errors are clustered with respect to 
both the treated and the control firm. This procedure, however, does not allow for weighting the 
observations.  Hence,  we  also  estimate  the  model  using  one  observation  per  treated  firm  by 
randomly  selecting  one  of  the  matched control  firms  and clustering  the  standard  errors  with 
respect to the control firm. Results are again similar with those presented in Table 4. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regardless of our set of matching variables, we find a negative and statistically 
significant constant term (i.e., the a  in equation (1)), consistent with H1. In terms of 
magnitudes, we find that the bank’s internal limits of “treated” firms drop on average by 
14.5% to 16.6% more than the internal limits of similar “control” firms (Columns (I) and 
(III),  respectively).  This  is  consistent  with  banks  adjusting  their  internal  limits 
downwards in view of the negative externalities resulting from the outside loans.  
Consistent with this interpretation we also find that the bank decreases its internal 
limit  more,  the  larger  the  outside  loan.  In  terms  of  magnitudes,  we  find  that  the 
coefficient of the OutsideLoan (i.e., the outside loan to total assets ratio) in equation (2) 
ranges  between  -0.762***  and  -0.952***,  depending  upon  the  matching  variables, 
whereas the constant term is not different from zero (Columns (II) and (IV)).
27 In terms 
of economic significance, a 1-standard deviation increase in the OutsideLoan (which is 
around 25% in both matched samples) induces a drop of the limit by 19.1% to 25.6% 
(i.e., -0.762*25.0% in Column II and -0.952*26.9% in Column IV). This also implies that 
$1 from another bank leads to a drop in the limit by 33 to 43 cents, respectively.
28  
All  in  all,  our  findings  suggest  that  banks  decrease  their  loan  supply  once 
borrowers become non-exclusive and they decrease it more the larger the outside loans, 
                                                 
27 ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
28 The change in the limit at  12 0 + t  following a change in the outside loan at  0 t  is equal to 
) / ( 12 12 1 0 0 - - * - t t s TotalAsset Limit b . This is obtained by solving equation (2) with respect to the 
limit at  12 0 + t  and taking the derivative with respect to the loan from another bank. The bank’s 
reaction is evaluated at the mean of the limit to total assets ratio in the two matched samples. 
   24
consistent  with  the  theories  on  contractual  externalities.  The  initial  bank’s  estimated 
adjustment is found to be smaller than the outside loan. This could be due to several 
reasons.  A  firm’s  initial  limit,  for  example,  could  be  already  lower  reflecting  the 
possibility of an outside loan. Similarly, contractual features, such as collateral and other 
covenants (whose use could be facilitated with information sharing) might allow banks to 
partly  mitigate  the  negative  externalities.  And  finally,  the  alternative  theories  which 
predict an increase in the internal limit might also be at work. Next, and before turning to 
H2, we discuss several robustness checks. 
 
5.1.2. Robustness Checks: Alternative Explanations and Additional Controls 
We begin by investigating whether our findings are driven by several alternative 
explanations: reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and reduced ability to extract rents. 
For all cases, to conserve space we report results for our most conservative matching set, 
Match 2, which allows us to better control for unobserved borrower heterogeneity. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
One possibility is that our findings are driven by reverse causality: a prior and 
gradual reduction in the internal limit has pushed the firm to another bank. To investigate 
this possibility we examine how the internal limit behaves in the period just prior to the 
non-exclusivity event i.e., t0–24 and t0–12. Re-estimating equations (1) and (2) using the 
earlier timing for our dependent variable, we find no evidence of reverse causality as both 
a  and  1 b  are close to zero and statistically insignificant (see Table 5, Columns (I)-(II)).   25
Note further that failure to increase the limit and accommodate the growing needs of a 
firm could also be a reason to seek outside loans, but this explanation does not account 
for our findings as it does not predict a decrease in the internal limit. In the absence of 
any externalities, a firm’s internal limit is not expected to change.
29  
A second possibility is that our findings are driven by an omitted variable bias. 
Firms  with  private  information  about  deteriorating  future  performance  may  have 
incentives to secure additional credit before their bank and other potential creditors learn 
this. Hence, the decreases in the internal limit that we document could be adjustments to 
the  news  about  their  performance. (Our  internal  variables  control  for  factors that  are 
observable to the initial bank, and thus do not account for this possibility.) To investigate 
this possibility we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) for the sub-sample of high quality 
firms (with a probability of default < 2% and no recent repayment problems at t0–12) 
whose condition did not deteriorate during the event window. As can be observed in 
Columns (III)-(IV) of Table 5, the results are very similar with those presented earlier in 
Table 4, suggesting that our findings are not driven by this alternative channel. 
Next, we also investigate whether the observed decreases in the internal limit are 
driven by reduced ability to extract informational rents. Proprietary information gathered 
over  the  course  of  a  bank-firm  relationship  might  allow  banks  to  extract  rents  from 
opaque firms that find it difficult to switch to other credit providers (see, for example, 
Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2004)). Although an outside loan would 
imply a reduced ability to extract rents, it is unclear that it should lead to a decrease in the 
                                                 
29 This alternative explanation could have accounted for our findings if instead of the internal 
limit we were using the firm’s outstanding debt at the initial bank, which often decreases over 
time as firms add or replace relationships (see Farinha and Santos (2002)).  
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bank’s willingness to lend to the borrower. The initial bank might temporarily become 
more aggressive in an attempt to win the “switching” borrower back. (This is in fact 
consistent with evidence in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) who find that subsequent loans 
to “switching” customers are priced even more competitively than the first loan.)  
Nevertheless, to investigate whether our findings are driven by a reduced ability 
to extract rents, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using the amount of fixed fees on 
lending products to total assets at t0–12 as an indicator of possible rent extraction. As can 
be observed in Columns (V)-(VI) of Table 5 the results do not support this alternative 
explanation: our key coefficients remain unchanged, while the estimated coefficients of 
fees to total assets are statistically insignificant in both specifications.  
Before turning to H2, we also investigate the robustness of our findings to a more 
stringent  set  of  matching  variables.  In  particular,  to  better  control  for  investment 
opportunities, we further require that between t0–12 and t0 the matched control firm got 
an inside loan of similar size to the treated firm’s outside loan (i.e., we require that both 
the treated and the matched control firms had similar demands for loans in the same 
period). As can be observed in Columns (VII)-(VIII) of Table 5, results are even stronger 
than  those  presented  earlier—  although  the  number  of  observations  is  substantially 
reduced. Finally, to better control for the strength of a bank-firm relationship, we also 
match on the length of the firms’ relationships with the initial bank. As can be observed 
in Columns (IX)-(X), the results are similar with those presented earlier. 
We now turn to H2, which we believe is also important for identification purposes 
as alternative explanations for our findings do not have predictions in line with H2. For 
example, if banks are reducing their limits because of reduced ability to extract rents (and   27
not because of the negative externalities associated with the outside loans) as discussed 
above, their reaction is not expected to vary with the degree to which their claims are 
protected. A similar argument could be made for a possible reallocation of internal limits 
between borrowers in the presence of limit constraints at the bank level.
  
 
5.2. Protection of the Initial Bank’s Claims: Test of H2 
Table 6 presents our findings with respect to H2. We first estimate the model in 
equation (3) using the FloatingCharge dummy for our key explanatory variable Z. As 
mentioned  earlier,  a  floating  charge  is  a special  form of  collateral  that  automatically 
carries over to future loans and thus allows the bank’s existing but also future loans to 
retain seniority over outside loans. The bank’s loans are also secured by the assets under 
the floating charge. The degree of protection depends on the value of the pledged assets 
as  well  as  the  volatility  of  their  values.  Hence,  we  also  estimate  the  model  using 
FloatingChargeValue and FloatingChargeVolatility for Z. Additional results with respect 
to other collateral are also presented to better understand the role of the floating charge.   
   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
All specifications are estimated for both Match 1 (Columns I-V) and Match 2 
(Columns VI-X). Results are qualitatively very similar between them. Hence, to conserve 
space we only discuss the results using Match 2— our most conservative and preferred 
matching set of variables. In Column (VI), the coefficient of the OutsideLoan,  1 b , is -
1.060***, while the coefficient of the interaction term with the FloatingCharge,  2 b , is   28
1.064***, resulting in a combined coefficient of 0.04, which is neither economically nor 
statistically different from zero. Consistent with H2, we also find that the coefficient of 
the FloatingCharge,  3 b , is close to zero and statistically insignificant. These findings 
suggest that when the initial bank’s claims are protected through a floating charge, the 
bank does not react to the size of the outside loan.  
Column (VII) of Table 6 presents our findings with respect to the value of the 
floating charge assets, FloatingChargeValue. The coefficient of the OutsideLoan,  1 b , is -
1.061***, while the coefficient of the interaction term,  2 b , is 1.939***. This implies that 
a 1-standard deviation increase in the FloatingChargeValue (i.e., an increase of 0.266) 
decreases  the  bank’s  responsiveness  in  the  outside  loan  with  about  0.52.  When  the 
FloatingChargeValue is larger than 0.55, which is roughly equal to its sample mean, the 
bank’s response in the outside loan becomes positive.  
In Column (VIII) we find indeed that any given outside loan triggers a bigger 
decrease in the bank’s willingness to lend, the higher the volatility of the floating charge 
assets.  In  particular,  the  coefficient  of  the  OutsideLoan,  1 b ,  is  -1.060***,  while  the 
coefficient  of  OutsideLoan*FloatingCharge,  2 b ,  is  1.643***  and  the  coefficient  of 
OutsideLoan*FloatingChargeVolatility  is  -17.407*.  This  implies  that  a  1-standard 
deviation increase in FloatingChargeVolatility (i.e., an increase of 0.048) increases the 
bank’s responsiveness in the outside loan by 0.836 (i.e., 0.048*17.407). This shows that a 
floating charge on assets whose values are volatile triggers a much larger contraction in   29
the  initial  bank’s  willingness  to lend.
30  In  contrast, the  presence of  a  floating  charge 
whose value of assets is not very volatile does not generate any reaction.  
To  further  understand  the  role  of  the  floating  charge,  we  also  investigate  the 
bank’s response when its claims are protected through other collateral types (this includes 
fixed  charge  claims,  pledges  and  liens).  Our  indicator,  OtherCollateral,  is  a  dummy 
variable that equals one when the bank’s existing debt is secured with other types of 
collateral (whose value relative to the outstanding loan is greater or equal to 80%) and 
there is no floating charge on the firm, and it is equal to zero otherwise. Everything else 
equal, this other types of collateral should be less effective as they do not necessarily 
allow  the  bank’s  future  loans  to  retain  seniority  over  outside  loans  and  they  do  not 
automatically carry over to the bank’s future loans. They could, however, help mitigate 
some of the externalities insofar as the fear of losing the pledged assets mitigates the 
increased moral hazard associated with the higher levels of debt.  
Results presented in Column (IX) of Table 6 suggest that this is not the case. The 
coefficient of the OutsideLoan,  1 b , is -0.966***, while the coefficient of the interaction 
term,  2 b , is 0.174. Including the FloatingCharge and OtherCollateral variables in the 
same specification yields similar results. The coefficient of OutsideLoan*FloatingCharge 
is  -1.095**  whereas  the  coefficient  of  OutsideLoan*OtherCollateral  is  0.299  (see 
Column  X),  suggesting  that  the  presence  of  a  floating  charge  mitigates  the  negative 
contractual externalities, while other collateral does not. All in all, these findings suggest 
                                                 
30 This finding is consistent with Bennardo et al. (2009) who argue that volatile collateral values 
magnify the negative contractual externalities. 
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that the explanatory power of the floating charge may rest on its ability to protect not 
only the bank’s current but also future loans.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Credit contracts are non-exclusive. While a set  of theoretical papers study the 
impacts of non-exclusivity on the initial creditor’s behavior, up to now, no empirical 
study  has  directly  investigated  the  impact  of  non-exclusivity  on  the  initial  creditor’s 
willingness to lend. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by employing a unique dataset 
that allows for the first time to directly investigate how a bank’s willingness to lend 
changes when an exclusive borrower obtains loans from another bank. This would not be 
possible using data on the outstanding level of credit as this is an equilibrium outcome 
driven by both demand and supply factors. 
Our findings are consistent with the theories on contractual externalities. We find 
that when a previously exclusive firm obtains a loan from another bank, the firm’s initial 
bank decreases its internal limit to the firm and it decreases it more the larger the size of 
the  outside  loans.  We  further  show  that  our  findings  are  not  driven  by  alternative 
explanations  such  as  reverse  causality,  omitted  variable  bias,  or  a  reduced  ability  to 
extract rents. Consistent with the theoretical literature on contractual externalities, we 
also find that the initial bank’s willingness to lend does not change when its existing and 
future loans are protected from the increased risk of default. In particular, we find that an 
outside loan does not trigger any change in the initial bank’s willingness to lend if its 
existing and future loans retain seniority over the outside loans and the claims are secured 
with assets whose value is high and stable over time.     31
Although our analysis focuses on credit markets, the insights drawn extend to 
other  markets  such  as  the  insurance  and  credit  default  swaps  markets,  where  the 
externalities resulting from the non-exclusivity of financial contracts have recently played 
a pivotal role in the current financial crisis. The collapse of AIG and Lehman Brothers 
has only highlighted the pressing need for an improved institutional framework that could 
help the involved parties to better evaluate and internalize the externalities. Consistent 
with  the  theoretical  literature,  our  results  highlight  that  information  on  counterparty 
exposures combined with contractual features, such as general collateral that extends to 
future exposures, could mitigate the externalities from counterparty risk. 
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Note.— This figure describes the event window. Firms enter the event window with an exclusive lending 
relationship with our bank. At time t0 an outside loan, originated at t’, is observed through the firm’s 
accounting statements. The window [t0-12, t0+12] captures the bank’s response to an outside loan.  
 
   
Figure 1: The Event Window
t0 t0-12 t0+12
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Note.— This figure reports the number of treated firms in each year as a percentage of the firms with an 
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Note.— We report the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) for the treated group, the control group, the matched treated groups after the first (Treated 
(Match 1)) and second matching procedure (Treated (Match 2)). The matching variables and procedure are in Table 2. *, **, and *** reported next to the mean 
and median values of the control and matched treated groups indicate whether the corresponding values are statistically different relative to the treated group at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Differences in means are assessed using the Student’s t-test. Differences in medians are assessed using the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables and the Pearson’s Chi-square test for categorical variables.  
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Names Definition
Mean Median  SD SD SD Mean SD
Firm Characteristics
Public
  Firm Age  Number of years since the date of registration  18.828 15.000 14.601 18.927 15.000 * 16.003 20.483 * 16.500 *** 13.870 21.251 ** 17.000 *** 14.047
  Total Assets Total assets of the firm (in 1,000 SEK) 389,000 3,093 7,600,000 224,000 3,760 *** 3,910,000 24,200 3,006 207,000 10,400 2,890 32,800
  Asset Growth Total assets at t/ Total assets at t-12 1.119 1.017 0.717 1.042 *** 1.009 ** 0.245 1.070 1.028 0.249 1.067 1.036 0.221
  Tangible Assets to Total Assets Tangible assets includes all fixed assets, accounts receivable, and inventories 0.716 0.814 0.270 0.687 *** 0.772 *** 0.274 0.795 *** 0.866 *** 0.192 0.814 *** 0.870 *** 0.173
  Cash Flow to Total Assets Eearnings before interest and taxes / Total assets 0.042 0.045 0.174 0.046 0.052 ** 0.192 0.056 *** 0.051 *** 0.084 0.051 *** 0.050 *** 0.070
  Total Debt to Total Assets Includes all debt obligations, excluding unused credit lines and taxes 0.428 0.424 0.297 0.431 0.415 0.273 0.471 ** 0.459 *** 0.218 0.507 *** 0.498 *** 0.206
  Total Bank Debt to Total Assets Includes all bank debt obligations, excluding unused credit lines  0.274 0.212 0.249 0.259 * 0.195 *** 0.254 0.296 0.250 ** 0.225 0.336 *** 0.307 *** 0.222
  Probability of Default Probability of default estimated by the main Swedish credit bureau  3.106 1.200 5.876 2.773 1.000 *** 6.336 1.805 *** 1.200 2.295 1.816 *** 1.200 2.347
  External Rating (1-5, 5 best) Takes values 1, 2,…5, where 1 indicates the worse and 5 the best rating 3.193 3.000 1.118 3.322 *** 3.000 *** 1.089 3.300 3.000 0.852 3.280 3.000 0.835
  Recent Repayment Problems a dummy = 1 if recent repayment problem with third parties, = 0 otherwise 0.032 0.000 0.177 0.021 ** 0.000 ** 0.142 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000
Private
  Internal Limit Maximum amount the bank is willing to lend to the firm (in 1,000 SEK) 29,200 1,046 230,000 21,100 927 *** 182,000 10,200 1,251 81,200 5,627 1,253 19,300
  Internal Limit to Total Assets Internal limit / Total assets 0.430 0.367 0.312 0.347 *** 0.295 *** 0.245 0.427 0.396 0.212 0.450 0.421 *** 0.201
  Distance to Limit (Internal limit- Outstanding bank debt - Unused credit lines) / Internal limit 0.135 0.048 0.191 0.115 ** 0.021 *** 0.203 0.123 0.048 0.158 0.088 *** 0.037 0.104
  Loan Interest Rate (%) Interest rate on oustanding loans at the initial bank (in %, annualized) 6.418 6.600 2.201 6.117 *** 6.250 *** 2.347 6.521 6.565 1.750 6.607 6.600 1.609
  Internal Rating (1-5, 5 best) Takes values 1, 2,…5, where 1 indicates the worse and 5 the best rating 3.148 3.000 0.890 3.313 *** 3.000 *** 0.892 3.163 3.000 0.775 3.098 3.000 0.762
Relationship Characteristics
  Multiple Relationships a dummy = 1 if a firm is borrowing from multiple banks, = 0 otherwise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.305 *** 0.000 *** 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  Credit Concentration Outstanding debt with the initial bank to total bank debt 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.882 *** 1.000 *** 0.264 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
  Relationship Length  Number of years since the earliest observed credit product at the initial bank 10.607 10.000 6.278 9.918 *** 9.000 *** 6.453 11.117 10.500 6.440 11.435 * 11.000 * 6.410
Outside Loan & Limit Adjustment
  Outside Loan Outside loan (i.e., a loan initiated at another bank) / Total assets 0.179 0.055 0.523 - - - 0.125 * 0.045 ** 0.250 0.126 0.046 * 0.269
  Adjustment in the Internal Limit [Limitt0+12/Limitt0-12]Treated - 1 -0.062 -0.073 0.783 - - - -0.110 -0.066 0.522 -0.090 -0.064 0.540
Collateral Information 
Floating Charge a dummy =1 if initial bank's debt is secured with floating charge, = 0 otherwise 0.066 0.000 0.248 - - - 0.077 0.000 0.267 0.077 0.000 0.268
Floating Charge Value  Value of floating charge assets (estimated by the bank)/committed debt 0.494 0.509 0.345 - - - 0.542 0.547 0.250 0.561 0.598 0.266
Floating Charge Volatility three-year earnings volatility /three-year average assets (if floating charge=1) 0.102 0.064 0.120 - - - 0.076 0.059 0.053 0.077 0.070 0.048
Other Collateral dummy = 1 if the initial bank 's debt is secured by any other type of collateral 0.170 0.000 0.376 0.227 *** 0.000 *** 0.419 0.200 0.000 0.401 0.198 0.000 0.400
with value greater or equal than 80% of the bank's outstanding debt 
Number of Firms
Number of Observations 991 51,164 207 350
991
Mean Median  Mean
Treated (Match 2) Treated (Match 1)
Median  Median 
Treated Universe




Note.— The table reports the variables included in the two matching procedures (Match 1 and Match 2), the number of possible values (#) and a list of values for 






   
Table 2: Definition of Matching Variables
Matching Variables Match 1 Match 2 #
Calendar Time
  Month-Year X X 45
Relationship Characteristics
  Multiple Relationships X X 1 both treated and control firms have a single lending relationship for at least one year prior to the beginning of the event window
  Credit Concentration X X 1 both treated and control firms at the beginning of the event window have a 100% of their bank debt at the initial bank
Firm Characteristics
Public 
  Industry  X X 46
  Firm Age X X 2
  Total Assets X X 2
  Asset Growth X X 2
  Tangible Assets to Total Assets X X 2
  Cash Flow to Total Assets X X 2
  Total Debt to Total Assets X X 2
  Total Bank Debt to Total Assets X X 2
  Probability of Default X X 5
  Recent Repayment Problems X X 2
Private
  Internal Limit X 2
  Distance to Limit  X 2
  Loan Interest Rate X 3 = 1 if the treated and control firms have similar loan interest rate (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar tangible assets to total assets (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the firm is younger then 10 years, and zero otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar EBIT to total assets (using a (-20%, +20%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar distance to limit (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
(1-5) corresponding to a PD in the [8.05%, 100%), [3.05%, 8.05%), [0.75%, 3.05%), [0.25%, 0.75%), and [0, 0.25%) range
= 1 if the firm defaulted on any payments during the last 24 months
= 1 if the treated and control firms have a similar internal limit (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar total debt to total assets (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar total bank debt to total assets (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar assets growth during (t0-24, t0-12) (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
= 1 if the treated and control firms have similar total assets (using a (-40%, +40%) window), and =0 otherwise
Possible Values and Definition
Two digit NACE codes
2003:04 - 2006:12  40
 
 
Note.— We report the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) of the characteristics of firms with and without floating charge included in Match 2. *, **, and 
*** reported next to the mean and median values of the no floating charge group indicate whether the corresponding values are statistically different relative to 
the floating charge group at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Differences in means are assessed using the Student’s t-test. Differences in medians are 
assessed using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables and the Pearson’s Chi-square test for categorical variables. 
Table 3: Firm Characteristics with and without a Floating Charge
Variable Names
Mean Median  SD Mean SD
Firm Characteristics
Public
  Firm Age  12.938 11.500 8.858 21.948 ** 17.000 *** 14.193
  Total Assets 11,800 2,583 21,800 10,300 2,895 33,600
  Asset Growth 0.968 0.998 0.180 1.076 * 1.037 0.222
  Tangible Assets to Total Assets 0.771 0.804 0.223 0.817 0.870 0.169
  Cash Flow to Total Assets 0.028 0.040 0.080 0.053 0.051 0.069
  Total Debt to Total Assets 0.518 0.510 0.209 0.506 0.498 0.206
  Total Bank Debt to Total Assets 0.322 0.211 0.268 0.337 0.317 0.219
  Probability of Default 1.881 1.850 1.442 1.811 1.200 2.409
  External Rating (1-5, 5 best) 3.188 3.000 0.911 3.288 3.000 0.831
  Recent Repayment Problems 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Private
  Internal Limit 6,021 924 11,700 5,593 1,294 19,900
  Internal Limit to Total Assets 0.488 0.400 0.296 0.447 0.429 0.191
  Distance to Limit 0.118 0.033 0.129 0.085 0.039 0.102
  Loan Interest Rate (%) 6.090 5.970 1.835 6.650 6.650 1.587
  Internal Rating (1-5, 5 best) 3.333 3.000 0.866 3.079 3.000 0.754
Relationship Characteristics
  Relationship Length 7.938 7.000 4.074 11.728 ** 11.000 ** 6.490
Outside Loan & Limit Adjustment
  Outside Loan 0.133 0.046 0.316 0.126 0.046 0.266
  Adjustment in the Internal Limit -0.031 -0.010 0.525 -0.094 -0.067 0.542
Collateral Information
  Other Collateral 0.125 0.000 0.342 0.215 0.000 0.412
Floating Charge No Floating Charge
Median   41
 
 
Note.—  The  table  reports  results  from  matched  regressions  relating  the  standardized  response  in  the 
internal limit to a constant term (Columns (I) and (III)) and to the size of outside loan (i.e. a loan provided 
by another bank; Columns (II) and (IV)). Columns (I) and (II) report the results for the first matching 
procedure  (Match  1)  whereas  columns  (III)  and  (IV)  those  for  the  second  procedure  (Match  2).  The 
definitions of all variables and matching procedures are provided in Table 2. We weigh each observation by 
one  over  the  number  of  matched  control  firms  for  each  treated  firm.  T-statistics  calculated  on  robust 
standard  errors,  clustered  on  a  treated-firm  level,  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  ***,  **,  and  *  indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Match 1 Match 1 Match 2 Match 2
Number of Observations (Matched Pairs) 1,421 1,421 549 549
Number of Treated Firms 350 350 207 207
Intercept -0.166*** -0.071 -0.145*** -0.025





- 0.050 - 0.110
Table 4: Non-Exclusivity Externalities and the Size of the Outside Loan: Test of H1




Note.—  The table reports results for Match 2. Columns (I) and (II) report results on reverse causality, where the dependent variable is the standardized response one year 
before the treatment (i.e., [Limitt0-12/Limitt0-24]Treated -  [Limitt0-12/Limitt0-24]Control ). All remaining columns study the standardized response over our regular event window (i.e., 
[Limitt0+12/Limitt0-12]Treated -  [Limitt0+12/Limitt0-12]Control ). Columns (III) and (IV) address a possible omitted variable bias, where specifications are estimated using the sub-
sample of firms whose condition did not deteriorate during the event window (i.e., firms for which the probability of default at t0+12 is smaller than the probability of default 
at t0-12 and have no repayment problems during the event window). Columns (V) and (VI) display results on rent extraction by including the ratio of fees to total assets as an 
explanatory variable. In Columns (VII) and (VIII) we require that between t0-12 and t0 the matched control firm got an inside loan of similar size to the treated firm’s outside 
loan to control for different investment opportunities. Finally, in Columns (IX) and (X) we add relationship length as an additional matching variable in Match 2 (we match 
using a +/- 3 years window). We weigh each observation by one over the number of matched control-group firms for each treated firm. T-statistics calculated on robust 
standard errors, clustered on a treated-firm level, are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 5: Robustness Checks: Alternative Explanations and Additional Controls
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2
Number of Observations (Matched Pairs) 344 344 339 339 549 549 46 46 201 201
Number of Treated Firms 132 132 154 154 207 207 38 38 122 122
Intercept -0.026 -0.015 -0.169*** -0.039 -0.151*** -0.030 -0.137* 0.143 -0.160** -0.008
(-0.448) (-0.288) (-3.329) (-0.851) (-3.044) (-0.571) (-1.758) (1.567) (-2.245) (-0.106)
OutsideLoan -0.074 -1.167*** -0.947*** -2.794*** -1.004***
(-0.487) (-9.424) (-4.190) (-3.982) (-4.342)








Note.— The table reports results from matched regressions relating the standardized response in the internal limit to a set of explanatory variables. Columns (I) to (V) 
report the results for the first matching procedure (Match 1) whereas columns (VI) to (X) report the corresponding results for the second matching procedure (Match 2). 
The definitions of all variables are provided in Table 2. We weigh each observation by one over the number of matched control-group firms for each treated firm. T-
statistics calculated on robust standard errors, clustered on a treated-firm level, are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Table 6: Non-Exclusivity Externalities and Protection of Initial Creditor’s Claims: Test of H2
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Match 1 Match 1 Match 1 Match 1 Match 1 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2 Match 2
Number of Observations (Matched Pairs) 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 1,421 549 549 549 549 549
Number of Treated Firms 350 350 350 350 350 207 207 207 207 207
Intercept -0.077* -0.075 -0.077* -0.058 -0.066 -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.016 -0.021
(-1.662) (-1.629) (-1.661) (-1.198) (-1.283) (-0.516) (-0.457) (-0.515) (-0.280) (-0.336)
OutsideLoan -0.815*** -0.816*** -0.815*** -0.802*** -0.871*** -1.060*** -1.061*** -1.060*** -0.966*** -1.091***
(-3.373) (-3.382) (-3.370) (-2.937) (-3.193) (-6.187) (-6.198) (-6.175) (-3.932) (-6.140)
OutsideLoan x FloatingCharge 0.715** 1.317*** 0.771** 1.064*** 1.643*** 1.095***
(1.981) (4.034) (2.015) (4.192) (3.931) (4.237)
FloatingCharge 0.084 0.041 0.072 0.061 -0.009 0.055
(0.786) (0.206) (0.662) (0.430) (-0.026) (0.377)








OutsideLoan x OtherCollateral -0.096 -0.088 -0.059 -0.054
(-0.896) (-0.812) (-0.634) (-0.576)
OtherCollateral 0.340 0.409 0.174 0.299
(0.918) (1.104) (0.496) (0.971)
R
2
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13
Dependent variable: [Limitt0+12/Limitt0-12]Treated -  [Limitt0+12/Limitt0-12]Control